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In this paper, we challenge the usual argument which  says  that competition  is  a  fair
mechanism because it ranks individuals according to their relative preferences between
effort and leisure. This  argument,  we  claim, is  very  insufficient  as  a  justification  of
fairness in competition, and we show that it does not stand up to scrutiny once various
dynamic aspects of competition are taken into account. Once the sequential unfolding of
competition is taken into account, competition turns out to be unfair even if the  usual
fairness argument is upheld. We distinguish between two notions of fairness, which we
call U-fairness, where “U” stands for the “usual” fairness notion, and S-fairness, where
“S”  stands  for  the “sequential”  aspect of  competition.  The sequential  unfairness  of
competition, we argue, comprises two usually neglected aspects connected with losses of
freedom: first of all, there is an “eclipse” of preferences in the sense that even perfectly
calculating competitors do  not  carry out  a  trade-off between effort and  ranking; and
second, competitive dynamics leads to single-mindedness because the constraints on the
competitors’ choices always  operate  in  the sense  of  increased  competitiveness  and,
therefore,  in  the  direction  of  an  increased  effort  requirements.  We  argue  (1) that
competition is S-unfair even if it is U-fair, (2) that as S-unfairness increases, the ethical
relevance of U-fairness itself vanishes, so that (3) by focusing as they usually do on U-
fairness alone, economists neglect much deeper aspects of unfairness.
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Introduction
Can competition ever be fair? This question seems to fly in the face  of  self-evidence
among most economists. Their immediate reply might well be: What, if anything, can
you suggest that does better, in terms of fairness, than a competitive system? Or, worse
still, our question is apt to be received with a smile. To many indeed, competition—at
least in its “perfect” version of a process so thoroughly purified of any distortions that it
can only be virtual—is the paragon of a fair mechanism: if you equalise all features which
make people initially unequal and for which they cannot be held responsible, then the
outcome of a non-distorted competition is necessarily fair. In fact, the procedure itself
becomes useless; just provide each agent with the equilibrium prices and they will directly
“hop” to the outcome. (The result that a competitive equilibrium from equal split of initial
resources is envy-free reflects this core intuition.) So why ask the question? Isn’t  the
answer totally obvious?
Our intuition when  starting reflecting on the fairness of competition as a principle of
socio-economic  organisation  was  that  this  “obvious”  character  is,  at  least  partly,
rhetorical. We want to show that there is a very powerful presumption against the fairness
of competition being a sound theoretical argument, let alone a sound social and political
one. The standard fairness-of-competition argument indeed rests crucially on the classic
split between resources (both external and internal) and preferences: if you have  been
given  the  same  resources  as  everyone  else,  the  outcome  of  competition  will  be
determined solely by  the interaction  of  your  preference-based  choices and  the  other
agents’ preference-based choices. Thus, it is necessarily a fair outcome, or so the usual
argument goes. Our main point in this paper is that this usual argument misses out on
crucial aspects of competition as a dynamically unfolding process; we will show that once
this dynamic unfolding is taken  into account,  competition  is  unfair even if  the usual
fairness argument is upheld. In that sense, our objective is that by defending competition
on the basis of the usual fairness argument, one is “barking up the wrong tree”: there is
something much more deeply unfair in competition, something which occurs even if the
usual fairness argument is satisfied. This “something” has to do with agents not being
able to  actually  apply their desired trade-off between leisure  and  effort  because  the
dynamics of competition has progressively restricted their choice sets in a way which
makes this trade-off impossible. To put it bluntly, an equal competition at a given point in
time, which is deemed fair by the defenders of the usual argument, might in fact be unfair
within the broader evaluative framework we advocate here. Thus, we argue that the usual
fairness-of-competition argument is not sufficient to be able to judge the fairness of a– 3 –
competitive process: that can only be assessed by looking at the whole sequence of steps
through which the process has shaped the individual competitors’ actual choice sets.
Our discussion will proceed in three parts. In section 1, we set out what we believe to
be the view of fair competition which underlies most usual defences of competition as a
fair and efficient procedure. Let us call this usual  fairness criterion “U-fairness”. This is
the usual view we want to challenge in sections 2 and 3. In section 2, we argue that the
fundamental dynamics of competition leads to the progressive, sequential curtailement of
competitors’ choice sets, even if the competition is U-fair at every stage in the process. In
section 3, we summarise the ethical issues which we deem crucial and we argue that this
process of sequential shrinking in the competitors’ options creates what we can call S-
unfairness—an unfairness which arises independently of whether U-fairness is satisfied
or not. In fact it will turn out, in the course of our argument, that the more S-unfair the
competition becomes, the more U-fairness itself becomes practically irrelevant: the only
way for U-fairness to be upheld will be for competition to be completely non-selective,
thus losing its hallowed feature as an efficient screening process. Thus, in our view, S-
fairness  should  stand  tall  alongside  U-fairness  in  the  debate  on  the  fairness  of
competition.  Therefore,  section  3  challenges  the  relevance  of  the  concept  of  a
“competitive equilibrium” as an adequate benchmark for the understanding of what the
overall fairness-of-competition debate should be about.
1. A formal model of competition: the criterion of U-fairness
Let us first give the usual fairness-of-competition argument its best shot. We want to
investigate the precise  scope  of  that argument  by  setting it within the   metaphorical
framework of a race, in which a fixed number of runners line up, run at the “go” signal,
and cross the finish line. Although highly stylised, this framework serves as the implicit
background for many discourses on competition being a fair procedure. The fairness-of-
competition argument, when transposed to the specific case of a race, says the following:
if  we  have equalised  all factors which  objectively  determine the  individual  runners’
absolute  (rather than relative)  performances,  the order  of  arrival  will  be  completely
determined by the various runners’ preferences for effort relative to gain, that is, by their
conscious choices. This can be modelled as follows. Let p i be the measure of runner i’s
performance, which in this case is simply the inverse of “running time.” (We take the
inverse so  that the “performance”  variable  will have the intuitive  property of  being
numerically higher when running performance is better.) The technology for producing
performance is simple: the runner needs a certain vector of m resources, which we denote– 4 –
ri ÎR
m, and a level of effort given these resources, which we denote  ei ³ 0. Therefore,
the “performance-production function” of the individual runner is
p i = F ri,ei ( ) with F(ri, 0) = F(0, ei ) = 0,
¶F / ¶r ih ³ 0 "hÎ{1,¼, m}, ¶F/ ¶ei >0  (1) 1
Note that, classically, we assume at this stage that resources in vector r exhaust all
non-effort variables which determine any agent’s specific performance: the  production
function F is taken to be a universal datum of human nature, somewhat analogously to
what Kolm (1971, 1998) has called “fundamental preferences.”  F  is  a  “fundamental
transformation technology” which translates resource-effort combinations into  running
times.2 We therefore assume that it is possible to explain all differences in  individual
“transformation capacities” as  differences  in  certain  causal variables  contained  in  the
vector r. What remains in the determination of the shape of F are then both universal
human characteristics and exogenous data such as the weather, wind speed, etc., which
affect everyone equally at given levels of effort and resources.3
Supposing, to  begin with,  that the agent is  endowed  with  a  (utility-representable)
preference ordering of effort-performance bundles, we can write her utility function as
Ui pi,ei ( )= Ui F ri,ei ( ),ei ( ), with ¶Ui / ¶F > 0,  ¶Ui / ¶e £ 0 (2)
 Note that we assume that the runner knows with certainty what is going to be her
performance given  resources and effort. More important, in a model so formulated, what
matters to the runner is her own absolute performance: what is important for her is to
participate, to do the best she can with respect to herself whatever she believes the others’
performances could be. This is a world of “emulation”; it is not the world of competition.
Indeed, in a competitive race, what obviously matters to a runner is not her own absolute
performance, but her relative performance—that is, her rank, which, as we will see later,
might be  the only  instrument  to  obtain a  prize  (see  equations (9)  and  (10)  below).
                                                                          
1 The zero value of the F function when either ri or e
i ii are zero means that both resources and
effort are necessary for a non-zero performance to be delivered.
2 A purely deterministic conception of the human being would of course reject the existence of
effort as pure “free will”, i.e., freedom independent of any external factors. See below the discussion
of Si  after equation (2’).
3 The exact specification of F also requires us to say something about the extent to which effort
and resources are substitutes. For the sake of simplicity, we just assume here that some minimal
effort is always required to be able to run. Further  specifications  might  make  sense,  e.g.,  that
particularly important differences in resources cannot be compensated for simply by differences in
effort.– 5 –
Accordingly, in a competitive framework, the F function does not enter explicitly as such
in the utility function, but only as one determinant of the expected rank.
Call  ri ÎN   the rank  attained  by  runner  i.  The  simplest  way  to  model  relative
performance  is to realise that runner i’s rank depends ex post on each and every runner’s
absolute performance:
ri = Y p1,¼,pi,¼,p n ( ) (3)
where n is the number of runners. However, given equation (1), runner i has to decide ex
ante the amount of optimal effort he is going to put into the race. Writing down equation
(3)  as  part of  his  decision  program  amounts  to  a  very  strong  assumption,  which
physicists have come to know as “Laplace’s demon”: it is assumed that (a) there is some
external viewpoint from which exhaustive causalities can be drawn up, understood, and
put together to form a fully determined model of the race, and (b) each individual runner
can take on this disengaged viewpoint ex ante, that is, before running. Nothing short of
this—even in  cases  where  this  causal model  is  accepted  to  be  stochastic—has  been
assumed in various versions of “perfect foresight” and “rational expectations.” Equation
(3), supposing we adopt it nevertheless, then allows runner i to form an expected-ranking
function:
E
i ri ( ) = Y E
i p1 ( ),¼,pi,¼,E
i p n ( ) ( ) (4)
Combining this with equation (1)—which amounts to assuming that the runner knows
for certain that this model of transformation applies to all his competitors as it does to
himself—we obtain
E
i ri ( ) = Y F E
i r1 [ ],E
i e1 [ ] ( ),¼,F ri,ei ( ),¼,F E
i rn [ ],E
i en [ ] ( ) ( ) 
4 (4’)
We then have an expected-utility function
Ui E
i ri ( ),ei ( )
= Ui Y F E
i r1 [ ],E
i e1 [ ] ( ),¼,F ri,ei ( ),¼,F E
i rn [ ],E
i en [ ] ( ) ( ),ei ( )
(2’)
Each individual has her own utility function; it determines all the possible trade-offs
that she can make  between effort and  the expected  value of  the race (probability  of
obtaining  a  certain  rank)  and  thus  all the possible  values  of  her  optimal  effort  ei
*.
However, we will realistically assume that there are some psychological constraints on
                                                                          
4 It is assumed that runner i believes rj  and ej to be uncorrelated.– 6 –
the maximal effort the individual will be willing to perform whatever the value of the
race. This means that ei
* is bounded upward by some maximal value ei
MAX. Thus, the
maximisation of (2’) with respect to  ei  has  to  take into account  an  additional  set  of
constraints: each runner i can select her effort from a possibility set which we will denote
Si. What is contained in  Si ? Since in the resource vector r,  “everything”  has  been
included that is given  as  a  datum  to  runner  i  and  thus  that she  should  not  be  held
accountable for, Si includes only the range of values of ei such that 0 < ei < ei
MAX, given
the subjective (psychological) factors which affect the “preferences” between effort and
its expected reward. We would like to label these factors the runner’s “willingness to
win.”
Thus, the full optimisation program of the runner is the following:
max
eiÎSi
Ui Y F E
i r1 [ ], E
i e1 [ ] ( ),¼,F ri,ei ( ),¼,F E
i rn [ ], E
i en [ ] ( ) ( ),ei ( )
s.t. E
i ek ( )ÎE
i Sk ( ) "k ¹i
(5)
If this has a solution, it is of the form
ei
* ri,E
i r1 [ ],¼,E
i rn [ ],E
i e1 [ ],¼,E
i en [ ] ( )ÎSi (6)
and it is only under the additional assumptions of (i) perfect information about everyone’s
resource vectors and (ii) common knowledge of everyone’s utility-maximising attitude
that we get a “reaction function” for i which can lead to a Nash-equilibrium computation
of everyone’s optimal effort levels:
Reaction function : ei








Equation (6’) gives us the equilibrium effort level which each runner i would choose
on the starting line given her information about the various data of the problem. From (1)
this will yield an optimal running time for each i and hence an optimal profile of ranks,
from (3):
p i
* = F ri,ei
* ( )  (1’)
ri
* =Y p 1
*,¼ ,pi
*,¼,pn
* ( ) (3’)
Both these equations are simply results of the simultaneous optimising choices of all
runners.– 7 –
In the standard perspective which we are describing in this section, this  solution can
be judged unfair for two reasons: either all runners did not have the same possibility sets
Sk  and this kept some of them from selecting a sufficiently high level of effort ; or all
runners did not have the same resource vector  rk and this kept their effort from being
efficient enough to attain a high enough performance level. Fairness in the usual defence
of competition would require at least an absence of envy, that is, no runner should prefer
to have another’s effort-rank combination. Let us call this criterion “U-fairness”, where
the “U” stands for “usual”. In the terms of our notation, U-fairness requires
Ui ri
*,ei
* ( ) ³Ui r j
*,ej
* ( ) "i,j (7)
The two conditions
(a) r i = rj  "i,j





guarantee that (7) is satisfied, according to the classical “equal-split” argument (see, e.g.,
Kolm 1971): all runners have the exact same resource vector and the exact same choice
set, so that the maximal available effort level is the same for everyone; therefore, any
runner whose preferences are such that—given identical resources—she chooses an effort
level which does not allow her to arrive at rank 1 by definition does not want to win given
the effort this would involve. Therefore, competition is U-fair if condition (8) is fulfilled.
Let us look carefully at what this implies.  Since by  assumption  the “performance
technology” represented by function F is the same for all individuals, U-fairness requires
essentially (a) that we equalise all  internal  and  external  resources  (the vectors r)  and
(b) that we provide all individuals with the same psychological opportunities for choosing
their level of effort. In “concrete” terms, this means essentially two things. To satisfy
condition (a) differential medical, nutritional, technical  and  other assistance has  to  be
provided ex ante to all competitors up to the point where they have fully equalised their
resource vectors. This  goes  as  far  as  making  all technical  advances which  improve
resources a fully public good (see Arnsperger and De Villé, 1999 for a more detailed
discussion). Moreover, along condition (b), no differential psychological barriers must be
allowed to persist. This may again require differential ex ante treatment for each runner.5
                                                                          
5 Obviously, as the whole literature on redistribution in economic environments after Dworkin
(1981) has shown, deep problems can arise for the no-envy criterion because of non-transferrable
inner resources (mainly, unchosen handicaps; see, e.g., Fleurbaey 1994, 1995a). This amounts to the
maximal available effort not being the same for all runners. If (8) cannot be satisfied for physical or
psychological reasons, envy-free effort-ranking profiles  cannot  be  obtained  from  an  equal  split.
Moreover, no such profiles may exist at all, i.e., solution (7) may contain no elements, even without– 8 –
Notice that two things at least  are, by  assumption,  excluded  from  the idea of  U-
fairness. First, the interdependence between preferences in determining the final ranking
is not judged per se an element of U-unfairness. But it is true that the strategic interaction
which all runners are here assumed to take explicitly into account might make such an
externality irrelevant. Second, preferences themselves are assumed to be entirely under
the control of the agents. Hence there is no room for any  complaint on  the basis  of
someone having “detrimental” preferences. If a runner has not won the race, it is because
she has consciously decided not to do so according to her own preferences about the
trade-off between effort and return which, of course, she should be held responsible for.
Provided full equalization  has  been carried  out  according  to  (8),  competition  thus
appears here as a perfect screening or selection procedure which,  by  allowing perfect
arbitrage between effort and ranking by all runners, yields a profile of ranks which exactly
reflects the differences in runners’ preferences. This, it seems to us, is the usual view
underlying most arguments by those economists who want to defend competition.
2. The “eclipse” of preferences and the will to victory
We would now like to claim that this neat preference-based model of fair competition is
deeply defective because it neglects two basic features of competitive settings.
First, on the starting line, even perfectly calculating runners will not carry out a trade-
off between effort and ranking. They will rather become immersed in a setting where
everyone acquires a uniform maximal will to victory—with the disturbing result that any
competition geared to perfect U-fairness (that is, respecting condition (8)) will inevitably
be completely non-selective:  all runners  must  display exactly  the same  performance.
Alternatively, if our argument below is correct, any competition which  exhibits some
selectivity is  necessarily  U-unfair.  In  other words,  competition  leads to  situations in
which  the real  freedom  for  each runner  to  choose  her  “optimal”  amount  of  effort
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
an equal split. Alternative criteria of fairness then need to be introduced (such as “undominated
diversity,”  for  instance;  see  Fleurbaey  1995b)  in  order  to  “cover  up”  the  impossibility  of
fairness—without, however, making a convincing case for these more artificial criteria. In fact, this
seems to be a key defect of the whole “postwelfarist” enterprise, namely, that it tries to recast the
notion of fairness so as  to  recover  new  possibility  results,  rather  than  recognising  the  radical
impossibility of fairness as no-envy in all except very special situations. Indeed, it is crucial to
distinguish  the  positive  proceedings  of  axiomatic  method,  which  frequently  seek  to  uncover
possibility results by adapting the content of the axioms so as to “weaken” them appropriately, and
the critical proceedings of political economy (within which our present discussion is located), in
which radical impossibilities may need to be tolerated as signs that something is seriously wrong
with the overall socio-economic system that is being discussed.– 9 –
becomes inexistent; in that sense, competition is unfair although formal freedom, i.e., the
free will of each runner, is still present.
Second, there is another notion of freedom as fairness, which is just as important as
the previous one, and which is also negated by competition. It has to do not with the
freedom to choose as such, but with the fact that the constraints on the runners’ choices
always operate in the sense of increased competitiveness and, therefore, in the direction
of an increased required effort on their part—the process, in fact, never requires constant
or decreased effort on anyone’s part.
2.1. The “eclipse” of preferences
The key to our argument lies in the perceived structure of payments which we claim the
runners face on  the starting line. In  order  to  separate  out  cognitive  from  conceptual
difficulties, let us assume that no runner has any limitations of computational ability, so
that no “bounded-rationality” argument has any bite. To begin with, let us assume that the
rank-to-payment mapping, which we will denote by W, is of the following form:
W : r ® p r ( )
w r  |  1 < r £ n ( ) = e ³ 0





If e  is very small, we may call this a “quasi-winner-take-all” scheme, in which the
runner ranked first receives most of the prizes while all subsequent ranks are paid almost
nothing. The “winner-take-all” case discussed in Frank and Cook (1995) is the particular
case where e = 0. For our present purposes, let us simply assume that the size of  e  is
such that it prevents any of the runners from “surviving” if  it is  her  sole  source  of
income. This means that, with appropriately reformulated utility  functions (since now
what matters to each runner is not her rank per se but only the income she gets from a
given rank), we have
Ui e,ei ( ) = 0  "ei ÎSi (10)
Equation (10) appropriately defines “survival” as zero satisfaction, i.e., “life no longer
being worth living.” It deliberately gives to this notion of survival both an objective (e )
and a subjective (Ui) component. It means that each and every individual, finding herself
in a situation where she gets e , would do “anything” to get out of that situation.
 Accordingly, runner i’s expected utility from taking part in the race is– 10 –
xi ei,E
i e1 [ ],¼,E
i en [ ] ( ) = pi ri =1 [ ] Ui W,ei ( )
¶pi / ¶ei > 0,  ¶pi / ¶E
i ek [ ] < 0"k ¹ i
(11)
It  is,  however,  absurd  to  assume  that the runner  will   merely  rest  content  with
maximising this function by trading off between effort and probability of victory, since
the alternative to winning is getting a utility of zero, i.e., simply failing to “survive.” It is
well known that in such cases the only sensible assumption is infinite risk aversion, with
the consequence that i’s optimisation program is simply
max
ei
pi ri =1 [ ] Þ
(11)
 ei
* = maxSi (12)
Consequently, provided  condition  (8)  has  still  been satisfied prior  to  the race, all
runners will cross the finish line at exactly the same moment: since by (12) everyone will
provide exactly the same (maximal) effort level, the only result of a U-fair quasi-winner-
take-all race is a total tie. In this sense, scheme  (9)  brings  about maximal  efficiency
because it forces  all runners  to  provide maximal  effort.  Note  that  this  requires  no
irrationality at all: each runner is fully aware that all others maximise their own probability
and hence will also select the maximal effort level. In other words, quasi-winner-take-all
always pushes runners towards their maximal effort, so that, if effort is upward-bounded,
each of them is being driven into a corner solution. The resulting non-convexity seems to
us a necessary condition for the “eclipse” of preferences.
We believe that it is a key feature of contemporary norms of economic interaction for
scheme (9) to be de facto present in all runners’ minds; in other words, we believe that
our race model can serve as a relevant metaphor for real-life problems connected with
economic competition. In real-life economic competition, some firms close down, some
employees lose their jobs, some salespeople do better than others: “real” competition is
indeed selective. But the costs for not meeting the standards imposed by the competition
are often felt to  be—or  actually  are—unbearable  for  the  individuals  who  might  be
subjected to them. What our analysis suggests at  this  stage is  that these individuals’
failure  to  “survive”  during  the race should  be  linked not  so  much  to  inappropriate
preferences  for  effort  but  to  the  lack  of  adequate  compensation  for  unintended
inequalities. In other words, actual economic competition tends to be U-unfair because,
being selective but also subjected to scheme (9),  it necessarily  violates  condition  (8).
Competition  submitted  both  to  the  U-fairness  condition  (8)  and  to  scheme  (9)  is
necessarily non-selective; alternatively, the only way  for  (12)  to  yield  a  differentiated
ranking is that (8b) be violated.– 11 –
 If scheme (9) is present in the form of a will to victory which is independent of the
structure of preferences and which eventually materialises in the form of actually “non-
survival” payments, the question is now: do we have reasons to believe that scheme (9)
will  emerge  as  the  result  of  competition  itself?  There  are  at  least  two  possible
interpretations: first, a form of “psychology of shame” which focuses on a reformulation
of (indirect) preferences, and second, a sequential mechanism by which repeated bouts of
competition force individuals to gradually put aside the normal play of their preferences,
given a particular but plausible setting. The two interpretations are clearly distinct: the first
one locates the “winner-take-all” property in a psycho-sociological or cultural datum; the
second one shows that a winner-take-all form can emerge as the end-point of a sequential
process of competition. In both interpretations, however, the essential feature is the same:
something is at work which curtails individual competitors’ choice sets in such a way
that each runner perceives herself to be facing a “winner-take-all” situation, independently
of her “unconstrained” preferences. We shall first describe the two interpretations (the
second one being rather longer than the first), and then focus on some  of  the ethical
arguments which they yield concerning competition.
2.2. Preferences and the “psychology of shame”
Let us assume that social customs and norms are such that—through a process which
could be  justified  by  various  socio-cultural  arguments—individuals’  utility  functions
contain a very strong “reputation effect” linked to the shame of not arriving first. This
may mean, in admittedly extreme cases, that individual i's utility is of the form
Vi E
i ri ( ),ei ( )=Ui E
i ri ( ),ei ( ) + Di E
i ri ( ) ( ),
with Di =
0 if E
i ri ( ) =1
-¥ if E





Clearly, the “symbolic” or “reputational” component is such that psychologically the
individual cannot bear to be less than first-ranked, in the sense that her expected utility
becomes infinitely negative if she does not expect to arrive at rank 1. The presence of
increasing psychic stress has been amply demonstrated as the result of the intensification
of competitive pressures (see e.g. Lane 1991: 480-489; Aubert and de Gaulejac 1991;
Schor 1992; Sennett 1998; Dejours 1998, 2000; Perilleux 2001). If individuals felt that
they were able to always adjust themselves “at the margin” to the optimal effort-expected
reward mix, no such stress should be observed. Thus (13) or something like it must be– 12 –
present if we are to account for various empirical cases of depression, burn-out, or even
workplace suicide.
2.3. How competition tends to create “winner-take-all” conditions
In order to understand how a form such as (13) can come to arise in a society, we have
to  look  at the “wider  picture” and  ask  ourselves  by  what  process  the evolution  of
competitive conditions within a society can lead agents to perceive their situation as a
winner-take-all one. What follows is an attempt to spell out a simple formal model in
which something akin to (13) arises endogenously. What is striking is that this can be the
case only if, alongside competition between runners, we introduce competition between
organisations setting up races for groups of runners, that is, between “stadiums.”
Let us suppose that there are S stadiums, denoted  s = 1,¼,S. At each period t (=1,
2, …) there is a race in each stadium. In a given stadium s, race t takes place given a
payment  scheme  Ws




t(ns) { }. There are thus ns runners in stadium s, and we shall assume at
this point that these runners do not have the possibility of moving from one stadium to
another. (As we will see below, the implications of this assumption are less alarming for
our present purposes than might be expected.) To  simplify,  let us  assume  that these
payments  always  add  up  to  a  fixed  amount,  so  that  in  each  stadium,
ws
t(r) = Qs > 0, 
r=1
ns
å "t.  The  stadium  finances  these  payments  by  collecting  a  fixed
entrance fee p from each of theNs
t spectators who come to see the race at period t. Each
stadium’s per-period profit is therefore
 Gs
t Ns
t ( ) = pNs
t - Qs (14) 6
which depends solely on the number of spectators of the period. Spectators move from
one stadium to the other in search of the lowest racing time; this means  that at each
                                                                          
6An alternative specification could be Gs
t Ns
t ( )= pN s
t -qNs
t = (1-q)Ns
t, where q is the fraction of
the budget paid out in “wages.” This would make the distribution of wages and profits proportional to
total receipts.– 13 –
period, those stadiums in which the winner was not the fastest of all winners lose some












This  corresponds  to  a  particular,  but  to  us  plausible,  assumption  about  spectator
behaviour: people go to a race to see not only a winner, but a fast winner. Therefore, once
all winners’ running times are known across stadiums, a fraction of the spectators of any
less-than-fastest race move to the stadium where the fastest race took place last time. An
extreme case of  this  would  be  the one  where  all  spectators  of  all  less-than-fastest
stadiums shift to the fastest one.7 The less extreme case portrayed in equation (15) is the
one  where  some  of  the spectators change  stadiums  after  knowing  all  the  winner’s
performances.
The effect of (15), of course, is that any stadium whose winner is  not  the overall
fastest—let us call her the “arch-winner” of period t—is certain to lose income in the next
period. So the basic idea is to motivate the stadium’s own winners to perform better next
time, so as to undercut the current arch-winner. Let us very crucially assume that each
stadium is run by an “owner” whose a-priori objective is to steadily increase profits over
time. This excludes the alternative scenario where the runners self-manage the stadium
and organise their  incentives  amongst  themselves—a relevant  but  altogether  different
case. What will also be presupposed is that either (i) there is a “shareholder value” type of
constraint which forces net profits to increase over time, or (ii) the owners figure that it is
rational for them to try to increase profits each period, since they foresee they are unlikely
to  have the arch-winner every period. Therefore,  we  shall assume  that  the  stadium
owners’ objective for any period t is
˜  G  s
t - ˜  G  s
t-1 > 0 (16)
Û ˜  N  s
t > ˜  N  s
t-1  given  p and Qs (16’)
                                                                          
7 In that case, in the next period S–1 stadiums have to organise a race with no spectators at all,
and no receipts, in the hope that their winner this time will be the fastest, so that all spectators next
time will flow to them, and so on.– 14 –
This is, of course,  an  objective  in  terms  of  notional  or  a-priori profit, which  we
indicate by the tildas (as opposed to realised quantities, which  are without a  tilda);  it
means that, notionally (i.e., before having observed the effective  running  times  of  all
winners in all stadiums) the owners want to have an increase in spectatorship and they
want  to  motivate  their  runners  in  that  direction.  Since  running  times  are  perfectly
observable,  there  is  no  problem  of  preference  revelation,  hence  no  principal-agent
problem. Given the arbitrage rule (15) and the runners’ motivational structure (10)-(11),
and given distributive assumption (8), the owner’s objective is to try to elicit increased
performance  (in  the  hope  of  having  the  arch-winner  in  one’s  own  stadium)  by
announcing an increased reward in case of victory. Thus, the implication of (16) is that
the distribution of rewards has to become less and less egalitarian through time, so as to
sustain profit growth by eliciting ever higher performance on the part of the winner. In the
absence of knowledge concerning individual preferences, and given condition (8), this
means that all runners’ performances have to be boosted over time. There at least two
(and perhaps more) ways of trying to elicit such steadily increased performance in the
hope of “screening out” the arch-winner at least some of the time. One way is to offer a
premium to the winner in case she undercuts last period’s arch-winner, which implies that
all non-winners get less if this happens. We may assume (although this is not strictly
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Notice that, by assumption, this implies that all ws(r >1) decrease over time if there is
undercutting. We may assume that the aggregate decrease in the non-winners’ rewards is
distributed equally over all non-winners in each period. Equation (17) poses a  classic
problem of potential ineffectiveness of the mechanism: if all runners together agree to not
running  faster than last period’s  arch-winner, no  premium  will be  paid because the
mechanism is conditional on results. Of course, such a “cartel” is highly unstable in the
absence of its formalisation as a “union,” as any runner has an incentive to deviate and try
to outperform last period’s arch-winner, in which case that one runner gains but all the
ns -1 others stand to lose. If all runners fear this without any possibility for individually– 15 –
binding commitment, there will be generalised effort towards outperforming the arch-
winner. Moreover, even if there is a “cartel” and no one deviates, this may in the long run
be detrimental to all runners because unless the arbitrage rule (15) is altered, the stadium
will eventually lose all its spectators. If all runners internalise this longer-run perspective
(which is not the case in the preferences as given by (10)-(11)), then (17) will be an
effective mechanism.
The other method to try and elicit undercutting is simply to announce unconditional
increases in reward inequality:
ws
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t(1) "s :p s
t < p max
t   
ws
t+1(1)= ws
t(1) "s :p s






This differs from (17) in only one respect, but one which is crucial: the conditionality
is not on willingness to improve over the past arch-winner; rule (18) says only that in all
stadiums where the winner is  not  also  the arch-winner, the next winner’s  reward  is
automatically increased—at the expense of all other runners’ rewards.8 We assume this is
not  the case for  the arch-winner  herself,  but  again  this  is  not  absolutely  essential.
Mechanism (18) offers no way of creating a “cartel” because rewards are pulled apart
independently of any increase in the winners’ performances.
The reason we discuss these mechanisms is to convey a simple fact. Although the
precise dynamic path of performances inside and across stadiums is immensely complex
and depends on all individual runners’ preferences for income and effort (equation (10))
as well as on their appraisals of probabilities of winning any given race, what is certain is
that overall the system is going to witness an eventual increase in performances (since we
assume that all preferences are monotonic in income), coupled with a steady widening of
the gap between top and less-than-first-ranked rewards. What is going to happen in case
the stadium owners all apply rule (18)? The steady state will be  attained  when  in  all
stadiums the rewards ws(r >1) have fallen below a level e >0 such that no one is able
to materially survive—whereas in each stadium the reward for winning next period’s race
has  grown  as  large  as  allowed  by  the  stadium’s  constant-budget  limit:
ws
t+1(1)= Qs - ns -1 ( )e .
Thus, in steady state, the interaction between the spectators’ arbitrage behaviour and
the stadium owners’ incentive mechanism yields, for each stadium, a situation exactly
identical with (9) above. In this case, fierce competition between stadiums leads to the
                                                                          
8 This device is closely related to the now well-studied incentive mechanisms of the “economics
of tournaments.” The seminal reference is Lazear and Rosen (1981). For the interested reader, a
general survey of this topic is provided in The New Palgrave, volume 2, pp. 745-746.– 16 –
point where  competition  within  each stadium  degenerates  into a  purely non-selective
process: as we saw earlier, faced with the prospect of non-survival in case she doesn’t
arrive first, each runner will apply (11) and simply “run for her life.” In the limit, faced
with this winner-take-all situation, no runner any longer has any possibility of making a
trade-off between effort and income:  given the fact that condition  (8)  is  satisfied by
assumption, the risk—created by competition between stadiums and the need  to  keep
profits growing—of having no chance of survival at all if one does not match the arch-
winner eventually transforms each and every runner into a local winner, and eventually
into an arch-winner. In other words, the limit of our process of competition between
stadiums makes it look like all runners have acquired a uniform “will to victory”: they run
as fast as they can and, having the same initial conditions, they arrive at the exact same
moment.  Of  course,  we  assume  that the per  capita  reward  for  winning,  which  by
definition is Qs/ns, is greater than the survival level e of each runner.
The end-state  of  the competitive  process  is  therefore  a  state where,  in  every still
existing stadium (some may have been eliminated through too long spells without an
arch-winner), there are no longer any winners or losers—this is the precise form which
our paradox takes here, namely that when U-fair and efficient (in the sense of inducing
maximal effort on the part of each and everyone runner), the competition within each
stadium is bound to exhaust itself as a process whereby the fittest are to survive, i.e., to be
selected.
3. Ethical implications: The curse of single-minded effort and the criterion of S-
fairness
“So what?” might be the  reaction  of  many  economists.  “Haven’t  you  constructed  a
model in which, through an arbitrage mechanism, competition eventually selects the most
efficient, i.e., effort-performing, agents? What does it matter if all runners  in  the still
existing stadiums all arrive at the same time? Haven’t we selected the fastest stadiums
nevertheless? In fact, is there any issue of fairness left to discuss, given that all runners
have exactly the same chances at the start of each race and that they all arrive at exactly the
same moment?”
Our reply to this is that such a  diagnosis  overlooks  a  much  deeper, and  virtually
invisible source of unfairness. If we look more closely, the very process by which the
non-selectivity of U-fair competition is reached contains a stark element of sequentially
emerging  unfairness,  which  we  shall  call  S-unfairness  (where  the  “S”  stands  for
“sequence”):  pressured  by  the spectators’ demands  for  the fastest possible  race,  all– 17 –
stadium  owners  send  their  runners  into  a  spiral  whereby  their  latitude  for  freely
expressing their trade-off between income and effort within acceptable bounds steadily
decreases. True enough, it is very difficult to say at which point in the  sequence this
latitude becomes unfairly restricted; what is certain, however, is that in the steady state
such latitude  is  totally  absent: each runner  applies rule (12)  because of  the absolute
impossibility of  doing  anything  else.  Although  U-fair,  in  the  distributive  sense  of
condition (8) being satisfied by assumption, competition becomes  S-unfair  because it
gradually  restricts freedom  due  to  the spectator-driven  sequence whereby  a  flow  of
increasing profit over time means eliciting ever more single-minded—or, for that matter,
absent-minded—effort from each and every runner. This being pushed into single- or
absent-minded effort, regardless of one’s preferences, is an element of the model which
should not be overlooked: it points towards a form of alienation which we believe must
not be kept out of the fairness-of-competition debate.
While U-fairness has to do mainly with a distributive norm to be satisfied at the outset
of each bout of competition (of each “race”), S-fairness has to do with each competitor
having  the  real  freedom  to  trade  off  effort  against  leisure.  It  is  not,  in  itself,  an
instantaneous distributive criterion: it has to do with the sequential evolution of choice
sets,  which  we  claim can be  ethically  objectionable  even  if—as  is  the  case  in  our
paper—U-fairness is assumed to hold at all stages in the process. Of course, if—as is the
case in the real world—U-fairness itself fails to be satisfied, the unfairness of competition
is compounded; but this does not imply that, analytically and ethically speaking, the two
kinds of unfairness should not be carefully kept apart. They “communicate” through the
fact that, as we have shown, the very emergence of S-unfairness makes U-fairness  a
trivial, and hence ethically empty, criterion. To put it differently, U-fairness, which is the
pet argument of most defenders of competition, is a relevant criterion only as long as
competition is S-fair; but since those who focus on U-fairness usually completely neglect
S-unfairness, their very focus on their pet argument makes it less and less relevant for
what they want to argue, namely that competition is supposedly an efficient screening
device.
Of course, one immediate criticism is that we have assumed runners to be immobile
across stadiums. Could not many of  them  find  a  way  out  of  the “Satanic mill”  by
changing stadiums, for instance by moving to a stadium where the structure of rewards is
not yet too uneven? The reply is relatively straightforward: of course they can, but this
mobility will only hasten the arrival of the steady state because stadium owners will only
take in the faster runners in the hope of taking in a potential arch-winner. As a result, the
most mobile runners will be those who already had a relative preference for effort in their
past stadium: this will compel all other stadiums  to  increase  the differentials  in  their– 18 –
reward structures even more so as to counteract the receiving stadium’s new recruitment.
As a result, while the dynamics of the system will surely be quite strongly affected by
mobility across stadiums,  the end-point is  unchanged:  some  runners  will be  able to
provisionally shelter themselves against too much restriction on their tradeoffs, but in the
steady state all possibilities of mobility will have been exhausted. The reward for winning
is the same everywhere, as is the gap compared to non-winning rewards.
So consumer arbitrage and the need to keep up profits sends the system towards a
limit-situation that is akin to the Walrasian equilibrium in neo-classical economics (see
e.g. Debreu, 1959 or Arrow and Hahn 1971): opportunities for heightening performance,
and hence for keeping profits on an increasing path, have been exhausted up to the point
where  there  is  literally  no  competition  going  on  anymore.  In  the  present  model,
competition has exhausted itself at the cost of a hidden unfreedom on the part of each
runner and of a lid on profitability for each individual stadium—and rather in the same
way, the expression “competitive equilibrium” is a misnomer: it is precisely the situation
where no competition is no longer happening because pure profits are down to zero and
no consumer’s welfare can be increased without decreasing  anyone else’s.  Therefore,
“general competitive  analysis”  is  ironically  the analysis of  a  world  in  which  every
participant in the competition  (every “producer”)  performs  exactly  the same,  and  in
which there is no competition (see De Villé 1980). This may be felt to be merely a recast
of old “Austrian” criticisms against the notion of equilibrium in economics, and indeed it
is to some extent—but what the Austrians such as von Mises, Hayek or Kirzner never
admitted was the alienation of those who participate in the process of (out-of-equilibrium)
competition, and this particular source of unfairness needs to be brought back into the
debate.– 19 –
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